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Diachronic Norms for
Self-Locating Beliefs
WOLFGANG SCHWARZ
University of Edinburgh
How should rational beliefs change over time? The standard Bayesian answer is: by
conditionalization (a.k.a. Bayes’ Rule). But conditionalization is not an adequate rule
for updating beliefs in “centred” propositions whose truth-value may itself change over
time. In response, some have suggested that the objects of belief must be uncentred;
others have suggested that beliefs in centred propositions are not subject to diachronic
norms. I argue that these views do not offer a satisfactory account of self-locating
beliefs and their dynamics. A third response is to replace conditionalization by a new
norm that can deal with centred propositions. I critically survey a number of new
norms that have been proposed, and defend one particular approach.
1. Introduction
Two epistemic norms form the core of classical Bayesianism. The first, probabil-
ism, is synchronic; it says that rational degrees of belief conform to the proba-
bility calculus. The second, conditionalization (or Bayes’ Rule), is diachronic; it
specifies how rational degrees of belief change as new evidence arrives. In the
simplest case, where the new evidence is captured by a single proposition E that
is learned with certainty, conditionalization says that the new credence Crt+1 in
any proposition A should equal the previous credence Crt conditional on E:1
Crt+1(A) = Crt(A/E). (C)
If the new evidence is equivocal, determining new probabilities x1, . . . , xn over
some evidence partition E1, . . . , En, (C) generalizes to (JC) (see Jeffrey 1965):
Crt+1(A) =∑
i
Crt(A/Ei)xi. (JC)
Many arguments have been given in support of these rules. Lewis (1999)
1. I will have more to say on what counts as the new belief state for a given ‘previous’
belief state in Section 6.
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(first reported in Teller 1973) and Skyrms (1987) show that probabilistically co-
herent agents are vulnerable to diachronic Dutch Books if and only if they do
not change their beliefs by conditionalization; Teller (1973) and Williams (1980)
show that conditionalization optimally preserves beliefs that are independent of
the new evidence; Greaves and Wallace (2006) and Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010)
show that conditionalization maximizes the expected accuracy of the new belief
state relative to the old belief state. These results all assume that the relevant
propositions (A and E, or A and E1, . . . , En) do not change their truth-value from
one time to another. They do not support conditionalization if rational credence
is defined over centred propositions whose truth-value is not fixed once and for
all. Indeed, it is widely recognised that conditionalization then becomes inappli-
cable.
Different authors have drawn different lessons from this observation. Some
have concluded that credences should always be construed as uncentred. Others
have taken the problem as (further) evidence that there are no diachronic norms
on rational credence at all. Yet others have suggested that diachronic norms must
be restricted to uncentred propositions. I will review these proposals in Section
2 and argue that they do not provide a fully satisfactory response.
Another type of response is to develop new rules for the dynamics of “self-
locating” beliefs. In Sections 3–6, I will look at the main rules that have been
proposed to this end, both in philosophy and in theoretical computer science.
One such rule, discussed in Section 3, is imaging; I argue that it yields sensible
results only in a very limited range of cases. In Section 4, I turn to a more
promising approach on which updating involves a process of first shifting the
centres of one’s doxastically accessible worlds and then conditionalizing on the
new evidence. This account seems to presuppose that an agent’s belief updates
are perfectly synchronised with objective time. In Sections 5 and 6, I consider
three ways of modifying the account so as to avoid this assumption. I argue
that two of the modifications are problematic, but the third one seems to work.
Finally, in Section 7, I return to an alternative that I set aside as incomplete in
Section 2 and show how it may be completed. At that point, we will have two
answers, but they turn out to be almost equivalent. I will not settle the choice
between the two.
A caveat before we begin. The proposals I will discuss have been developed
in different contexts, with different background assumptions, different notation,
and a focus on different problems. Here I will abstract away from these differ-
ences, presenting the core of the relevant proposals as they bear on my topic, in
my own notation. I will also ignore various subtleties in the discussed propos-
als that do not affect the points I will make. For the full picture, the reader is
advised to consult the cited works.2
2. The survey Titelbaum (2016) may also be useful, as it approaches the present topic from
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2. Self-Location and Conditionalization
To motivate the search for new norms on the dynamics of self-locating belief—
and to clarify what exactly we are looking for—let me briefly review why we
need centred objects of credence, and why we should believe that such credences
are subject to diachronic norms.
The Bayesian concept of credence is a technical term. Whether we should
allow for centred objects of credence therefore depends on the theoretical roles
credences are meant to play. One key role lies in the theory of rational choice.
According to Bayesian decision theory, rational agents choose actions that max-
imize expected utility relative to the agents’ credences and utilities; this is how
their behaviour can be explained by their (graded) beliefs and desires. Now as
Perry (1977) vividly pointed out, the actions we choose often depend not only
on our beliefs about the world as a whole, but also on where we locate ourselves
in space and time. You and I may agree that somebody is being attacked by a
bear, and on all other relevant propositions about the objective world, but if you
locate yourself as the person under attack while I take myself to be an onlooker,
our rational response will be very different. Similarly, we may take quite differ-
ent actions if you believe that an important meeting starts in half an hour while
I believe that it starts now, even if we both agree that it starts at noon. If cre-
dences are to play their standard role in guiding and explaining actions, these
observations suggest that our credences are not exhausted by our views about
the objective world: it also matters where we locate ourselves within the world.
Another key role for the concept of credence lies in Bayesian confirmation
theory, which models how and to what extent hypotheses are supported by an
agent’s evidence. Here, too, allowing for centred hypotheses and centred evi-
dence has proved useful—for example, when trying to understand how the ev-
idence that things around us are such-and-such bears on the hypothesis that the
universe contains many (or few) places where things are such-and-such (see, e.g.,
Arntzenius & Dorr 2017; Bostrom 2002; Sebens & Carroll 2017). Indeed, as Lewis
(1979) pointed out, one can seemingly imagine an agent who knows all objective
facts about the world from a God’s eye perspective but is still ignorant about who
and where she is in the world, and who might learn so through further evidence.
The standard way to accommodate these phenomena, going back to Lewis
(1979), is to construe the objects of credence in such a way that their truth-value
may vary not only from possible world to possible world, but also from time to
time, from place to place, and from individual to individual. Suitable objects
a slightly different angle—asking how agents should “coordinate” their credences at different
times—and looks at some proposals in more depth. On the other hand, Titelbaum’s survey does
not discuss views from theoretical computer science and treats all the proposals from Sections
4–6 as one, for which Kim (2009) is taken as representative. As I will explain in Footnote 9
below, on the way I draw the lines it is doubtful whether Kim (2009) even belongs to this family.
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are not hard to find. Lewis suggests identifying the objects of credence with
properties; a property is “true” relative to a given individual at a time and a
world just in case the individual instantiates the property at the time and the
world. Other authors use sentence types as objects of credence, drawing on the
natural sense in which, for example, the English expression ‘it is raining’ is true
at some times and places and false at others. Another popular idea is to construe
objects of credences as sets of triples of an uncentred world, a time, and an
individual; the set is “true” relative to an individual at a time and a world just in
case the corresponding triple is in the set. Yet another option is to take centred
propositions as theoretical primitives, or to construe them as states of affairs in
the tradition of Plantinga (1974) and Pollock (1984): a state of affairs like the sun
shining can plausibly obtain at some times and places and not at others.
For what follows, the difference between these proposals will not be impor-
tant. As a neutral label, I will call any object in the domain of an agent’s credence
function a (centred) proposition. Classical, uncentred propositions can be treated
as limit cases of centred propositions (as Lewis 1979 explains).
Probability theory requires that the space of propositions is closed under
conjunction, disjunction, and negation. To simplify the following discussion, I
will make the slightly stronger assumption that the propositions form a com-
plete atomic Boolean algebra, so that propositions can be identified with sets of
atoms in the algebra, where an atom is a maximally consistent conjunction of
propositions. I will refer to these atoms as centred worlds.3
It is sometimes claimed that the phenomena reviewed above are instances of
Frege’s puzzle which supposedly has been solved without departing from clas-
sical views about the nature of propositions (e.g., Cappelen & Dever 2013; Magi-
dor 2015). I disagree. The bear case, for example, does not involve ignorance of
identities—the defining feature of Frege’s Puzzle. But it does not matter. Even if
we grant the objection, we’d arguably still need centred objects of credence. To
illustrate, suppose we follow Salmon (1986) and explain Frege’s puzzle by appeal-
ing to “guises” under which classical propositions are believed. To handle the
above observations in a parallel fashion, we will have to invoke indexical guises,
and we will have to identify the objects of credence with propositions-under-
guises, since the guises matter to confirmation and rational choice. As a result,
3. If propositions are construed as sentences or states of affairs (say), then they are of course
not literally identical to sets of maximally consistent conjunctions of propositions. However,
under plausible assumptions, the quotient algebra of the propositions under the relation of
logical equivalence will still be a complete atomic Boolean algebra, and hence isomorphic to the
power set algebra of the atoms. (Intuitively, since every proposition is logically equivalent to a
disjunction of maximally consistent conjunctions, and since probability theory requires logically
equivalent propositions to have the same probability, we can harmlessly use sets of maximally
consistent conjunctions as proxies for propositions, interpreting the sets as disjunctions of their
members.)
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the objects of credence—propositions in the present, stipulative sense—will be
centred. We can happily allow that “propositions” in some other sense (referents
of ‘that’-clauses, perhaps) are uncentred, but since our topic is the dynamics of
credence, that other sense is not immediately relevant.
To be sure, one might still try to account for the reviewed phenomena in
some other way, without making the objects of credence centred. The most ex-
tended defence of this strategy is due to Robert Stalnaker (see Stalnaker 1981;
2008: Chapter 3; 2014: Chapter 5; 2016), who suggests modelling an agent’s dox-
astic state by an uncentred credence function together with “links” representing
where the agent locates herself relative to any uncentred world she deems pos-
sible. The dynamics of these states is complicated because both the underlying
probability space and the links frequently change, in ways Stalnaker does not
fully explain. Without exploring such alternatives any further, from now on I
will assume that the objects of credence are centred.
We must then be careful when we think about relations between agents who
locate themselves at different places or times. For example, suppose you utter ‘it
is raining’ and thereby express high credence in the centred proposition that it is
raining.4 Even if I trust your assertion, I may not come to assign high credence
to the same centred proposition: if I believe that you are located 500 km to the
North of me (we are talking on the phone), I will rather come to believe that it
is raining 500 km to the North. So successful communication is not simply a
matter of transferring beliefs (see, e.g., Weber 2013). Similarly, if you assign high
credence to the centred proposition that it is raining, and I assign low credence
to that same proposition, then this does not constitute a genuine disagreement
between you and me. The intuitive concepts of agreeing, disagreeing, having the
same belief, etc., therefore can’t be analysed simply in terms of assigning high
credence to the same proposition or to incompatible propositions.5
Analogous problems arise for beliefs of the same agent at different times—
which brings us back to conditionalization. Suppose after our conversation on
the phone you fall asleep; when you later wake up, you do not receive any new in-
formation about the weather. Nonetheless, your confidence in the centred propo-
sition that it is raining should decrease, especially if you have reasons to believe
that it wouldn’t rain all day. You should still be confident that it was raining when
you fell asleep, but you should be less confident that is is raining. It is hard to
4. By ‘the centred proposition that it is raining’ I mean a centred proposition that is true at
a place and a time and a possible world just in case it is raining at that place at that time in that
world. I will use this shorthand form throughout the present paper.
5. A popular objection to centring objects of credence is that this would yield false pre-
dictions about when two subjects agree/disagree or believe the same/different things (e.g.,
Bradley 2013; Stalnaker 2008: 50; 2014: 114). But the problematic predictions follow only under
a naive and entirely optional analysis of these concepts. (Recall that credence is a technical
term.)
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see how this change could come about by conditionalization. Conditionalization
only reduces your credence in a proposition if the new evidence is relevant to
that proposition, but by assumption you do not gain any new evidence about
the weather: whatever evidence E you receive, your previous credence in rain
conditional on E may well have been high, yet your new credence is low.
Conditionalization is a rule for revising one’s beliefs about the state of the
world in light of new information about that same state. It fails to take into
account that the world itself may change: that what was true before may have
come to be false.
Some authors have taken the present difficulty as (further) support for the
view that we should dispense with diachronic constraints on rational belief. Ac-
cording to these authors, what one should believe at any point of time is simply
a matter of one’s evidence at that time; the earlier beliefs don’t matter. More
precisely, if E captures an agent’s present total evidence, then (on the present
view) her credence should equal some ur-prior P conditional on E, where the ur-
prior is something like a measure of evidential support, not the agent’s previous
credence function (see, e.g., Arntzenius & Dorr 2017; Christensen 2000; Hedden
2015; Horgan 2008; Levi 1980; Meacham 2016; Moss 2014; Williamson 2000).
At first glance, ur-prior conditionalization (as Meacham 2016 calls it) seems to
elegantly avoid the problem of updating self-locating beliefs. On closer scrutiny,
however, the problem is not so easily discharged.
The issue turns on the interpretation of ‘evidence’. In classical Bayesianism
(as employed for example in artificial intelligence), the new evidence E that is
plugged into conditionalization can be understood as the information conveyed
to the agent through her senses at the relevant time.6 Such a sensory conception of
evidence would render ur-prior conditionalization utterly implausible: the vast
majority of our beliefs are not supported by present sensory evidence, yet that
does not make them irrational. Ur-prior conditionalization therefore requires a
different conception of evidence on which our total evidence includes informa-
tion we acquired on earlier occasions—something like Lewis’s (1996: 424) notion
of evidence as ‘perceptual experience and memory’, where ‘memory’ covers not
only occurrent episodes of remembering (which would still leave almost all our
beliefs unsupported by present evidence), but also sub-consciously retained in-
formation.
6. What is the information conveyed to an agent through her senses? Good question. It
is certainly not what philosophers of perception call the ‘content’ of perceptual experience—
roughly, the conditions under which we would judge the relevant experience to be veridical. For
it would often be irrational to become absolutely certain that these conditions obtain. Jeffrey
(1988) suggests that sensory information is best modelled as probabilistic information, in which
case it will plausibly be sensitive to the agent’s prior beliefs (see also Christensen 1992; Field
1978; Garber 1980; Weisberg 2009). There are thorny problems here, but exploring them would
take us too far afield.
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It is here where the problem of updating reappears. Before you fall asleep,
you see that it is raining; upon awakening, you remember that it was raining.
Somehow your earlier evidence that it is raining transformed into your new evi-
dence that it was raining. What are the rules for these transformations? Clearly
not just anything goes. Suppose the information that it is raining had trans-
formed into a false memory that the Earth is flat, so that you had woken up
believing that the Earth is flat. Something would have gone wrong; your new
belief would not be justified. So there are normative constraints on the dynamics
of (non-sensory) evidence. What are these constraints?7
To be clear, this does not show that the ur-prior account is wrong. My claim
is only that it is incomplete, and that it does not escape the problem of updating
self-locating information.
The same is true for a closely related family of views on which there are nor-
mative constraints on how uncentred credences should evolve over time, but no
such constraints for centred credences. On the most popular way of developing
this idea, your new credences are determined by first conditionalizing your pre-
vious uncentred credences (i.e., your credences over uncentred propositions) on
the uncentred information provided by your new evidence and then using the
self-locating part of your new evidence to determine your location (see Briggs
2010; Halpern 2006; Meacham 2008; Piccione & Rubinstein 1997; Titelbaum 2008;
2013).8 Moss (2012) defends a variant approach on which your new credences
7. It is tempting to think that non-occurrent memory simply is belief: I will remember that
Astana is in Kazakhstan as long as I keep believing that Astana is in Kazakhstan; no second
attitude is required or involved. If that is right, then taking an agent’s non-occurrent memories
as given amounts to taking a substantial part of their new beliefs as given; the missing story on
the dynamics of memory is a missing story on the dynamics of belief.
8. The line between these accounts and ur-prior accounts is blurry because stepwise
conditionalization on uncentred evidence is equivalent to conditionalizing the initial credence
on the cumulative uncentred evidence. The account developed in Titelbaum (2008) and (2013)
looks superficially different from the summary I’ve just given, but has essentially the same
structure. Titelbaum notes that agents can often “translate” any given centred proposition into
an uncentred proposition which is certain to have the same truth-value and therefore must
have the same probability. For example, if at t you are certain that nobody else in the history of
the universe ever had or ever will have the very same total phenomenal experience X that you
have right now, then you can be certain that it is raining has the same truth-value as it is raining
at the unique time and place where someone has experience X. Assuming that conditionalization
is suitable for uncentred propositions, Titelbaum suggests that your new credence in the
translated propositions should equal your previous credence conditionalized on your uncentred
new evidence. To determine the new probability of centred propositions, we then have to use
the centred part of your evidence to find new translations between centred and uncentred
propositions. For example, if your new evidence entails that you have phenomenal experience
Y, your new credence in it is raining might equal your updated credence in it is raining at the
unique time and place where someone has Y. The upshot is that the new credences are determined
by conditionalizing the uncentred previous credences on the uncentred evidence and then
re-introducing the centres based on the new evidence.
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are determined by first setting aside the previous self-locating beliefs, then us-
ing a certain part of your new evidence (provided by your “sense of time”) to
determine your location, and finally conditionalizing on the remainder of your
centred and uncentred evidence.9
Like ur-prior accounts, these accounts plausibly require a non-sensory con-
ception of evidence. Imagine an agent—a robot perhaps—whose senses provide
only limited information about the arrangement and colour of mid-sized objects
in her environment. In order to reach some goal, the agent has to pass through
two rooms with identical interiors; in the first she has to exit on the left, in the
second on the right. Having entered the first room, the agent’s previous uncen-
tred beliefs together with her sensory evidence do not settle whether she is in
the first room or in the second. But surely the agent should not become uncer-
tain about where she is. To deliver this verdict, the accounts just reviewed must
assume that the agent’s evidence includes the information that she is in the first
room, determined by some transformation from her previous belief that she is
about to enter that room.
Again, the problem is not so much that these views are wrong, but that they
are incomplete: they do not give a full account of how rational beliefs evolve over
time.10
Until further notice, I will henceforth reserve the term ‘evidence’ for sensory
evidence. Our question is how an agent’s credences over centred and uncentred
propositions should change as time passes and new information arrives from the
agent’s senses. There may be reasons for tackling the question indirectly, by first
defining a richer notion of evidence that includes information the agent received
at earlier times, suitably transformed to take into account the passage of time.
In Section 7 I will explain how the relevant evidence transformations might go,
and thus how the accounts just reviewed might be completed. In the meantime,
I will look at accounts on which an agent’s credences are determined directly
by her earlier credences and her new (sensory) evidence, without appeal to a
further conception of non-sensory evidence that is subject to diachronic norms
of its own.
9. Kim (2009) defends a similar account, but he does not say where the new beliefs about the
time come from: whether they are determined by some combination of the previous uncentred
beliefs and the new evidence—as in Moss’s account—or whether the previous centred beliefs
also play a role. I will have a little more to say on the proposals of Moss and Kim in Footnotes
14, 16, 17, and 20 below.
10. In addition, most (if not all) the views I have reviewed deliver highly implausible
verdicts in cases where the evidence does not suffice to determine a unique centre in every
accessible uncentred world; see, e.g., Bostrom (2002: Chapters 7 & 9), Meacham (2008: 260–265),
Schwarz (2015: 662-665), Arntzenius and Dorr (2017: Section 2).
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3. Imaging
In Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991), a classical paper in theoretical computer sci-
ence, Katsuno and Mendelzon distinguish two rules for updating a knowledge
base. The rules are best introduced by example.
At t you are confident that a certain basket contains either two apples or
an apple and a banana; you give equal credence to both possibilities. At
t+1 you learn E: that there is no banana in the basket.
You might treat the new information as a reason to revise your beliefs, conclud-
ing that there are two apples in the basket. But you might alternatively treat E
as a message about how the world has changed, without revealing anything new
about what was the case at t. In particular, you may come to know E by learning
that someone went out to remove any bananas from the basket. In that case, you
should not conclude that there are two apples in the basket. Rather, your new
credence should be divided between the hypothesis that the basket contains one
apple and the hypothesis that it contains two.
The first kind of belief change Katsuno and Mendelzon call revision, the sec-
ond update. Updating, they suggest, is “bringing the knowledge base up to date
when the world described by it changes” (1991: 387). Working in the AGM tradi-
tion of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (1985), they characterize the two
processes by axioms for operations on a qualitative (non-probabilistic) knowl-
edge base. The probabilistic analogs of these two operations (as explained, e.g.,
in Kern-Isberner 2001 and Walliser & Zwirn 2002) are conditionalization and
imaging.
Imaging was originally introduced in Lewis (1976a) for a somewhat different
purpose. It works as follows. Let P be a probability measure over some “worlds”
W; let f : W × P (W) → W be a function that maps any world w and proposition
E to whichever E-world is most similar to w, relative to some fixed similarity
ordering; finally, let [[A]]w denote the truth-value of A at w (1 = true, 0 = false).
Then the image of P on E, which I’ll write as P(·//E) (with two dashes), is defined
by
P(A//E) = ∑
w∈W
P(w)[[A]] f (w,E).
Intuitively, imaging on E shifts the probability mass of every world to the “most
similar” world that satisfies E.
So we have a first proposal of how an agent’s credences should evolve in
order to keep track of a changing world: if E is the new evidence received at
t+1, then the new credence should equal the previous credence imaged on E:
Crt+1(A) = Crt(A//E). (I)
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The rule can be generalized to cases where the evidence is equivocal or where
there is more than one “most similar” world, but let’s stick with the easy case.
I have put ‘most similar’ in scare quotes because the relevant function f need
not track intuitive similarity. For the present purpose, f should rather assign to
w and E whatever state of the world would result from minimally changing w
into a state where E is true.
To see all this in action, return to the fruit basket scenario. At t, your cre-
dence is divided between two (coarse-grained) centred worlds or world states: a
two-apples-no-banana world and a one-apple-one-banana world. Learning that
somebody intervened so as to make it true that there are no bananas in the bas-
ket, your credence in the one-apple-one-banana world is moved to a one-apple-
no-banana world, because that is the world that results from the one-apple-one-
banana world by making ‘no bananas’ true. Your credence in the two-apples-no-
banana world remains unchanged, because that world already satisfies the ‘no
bananas’ constraint.
The imaging account is popular in some quarters of theoretical computer sci-
ence, but has gained almost no traction among philosophers (though see Leitgeb
2016). For good reasons.
A minor point first. It is not an a priori truth that removing a banana from a
basket containing an apple and a banana leads to a state in which the basket con-
tains just an apple. So either the imaging function f encodes contingent causal
information about the world—in which case one would like to know how this
information is updated over time—or the agent’s probabilities must be defined
over much more fine-grained states than usually assumed, so that a given world
fixes not only how many fruits are in the basket but also what would happen
under various interventions. Let’s assume we have such a fine-grained represen-
tation.
The main problem with the imaging rule (and its non-probabilistic analog of
‘updating’) is that it only applies under conditions that are almost never satisfied:
when the information one receives about a change in the world reveals nothing
about what the world was like before.11 Suppose you learn not that there is no
banana in the basket, but more specifically that a banana has been removed from
the basket. This is information about a change, but it also reveals that the basket
previously contained a banana. Upon receiving the information, you should
become confident that the basket contains one apple and no banana, but imaging
does not apply (and would not deliver that result12). Here we need a different
11. I am not the first to make this complaint: see, e.g., Boutilier (1998) and Lang (2007).
12. The result of applying imaging depends on what counts as the closest world to a
two-apples-no-banana world at which a banana has been removed. Presumably it’s a world
where a banana is first added and then removed. Imaging would then leave you undecided
between a one-apples-no-banana world and a two-apples-no-banana world.
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rule for “bringing the knowledge base up to date”.
It is hard to think of any realistic case where the information one receives is
entirely neutral on what the world was like before. The most promising examples
involve decisions or commands. If you are certain all along that you could make
E true and then decide to make E true, one might think that your decision carries
no news about what the world was like before. But even that is not generally
true. In Newcomb’s Problem, for example, a decision to two-box indicates that
the opaque box is empty; the epistemic impact of reaching the decision from a
prior state of indecision is therefore not adequately modelled by imaging.
Even in the rare and unusual case where the information one receives sheds
no light on what the world was like before, imaging can give wrong results
because changes in the world are not always revealed to the agent. Suppose
again at t you believe that the fruit basket contains either two apples or an apple
and a banana. But suppose you also believe that a fly is sitting on the basket.
Then you instruct somebody to remove all bananas, and at t +1 you learn that
the instruction has been carried out: there are no bananas in the basket. Imaging
preserves your credence in scenarios that already satisfy the new information (no
bananas). Thus it would leave you certain that if the basket contains two apples
then there is a fly on the basket. But if you know that flies generally don’t sit at
the same place for long, you should not remain certain about this.
In sum, imaging does not provide a satisfactory answer to our question. It
only applies in rare and unusual cases, and even then tends to give the wrong
answers.
4. Shifting
The next approach I am going to discuss is the de facto standard in control theory
and artificial intelligence (see, e.g., Russell & Norvig 2010: Chapter 15).
We just saw that in order to describe how an agent’s beliefs should change
over time, we need to consider not only her beliefs about the present state of the
world, but also her beliefs about how this state may evolve, either as the result
of her actions or by itself. In artificial intelligence, such beliefs are commonly
represented by a transition model which is added to the agent’s probability mea-
sure over world states. In the simplest case—assuming that time is linear and
discrete, that the immediate future depends only on the present, and that the
agent doesn’t intervene in the course of nature13 —the transition model defines
a conditional probability over world states at any time t +1 conditional on the
state at the previous time t.
13. All these assumptions can be dropped, leading to more complicated models. I stick to
the simplest case because the issues I am going to discuss do not depend on the complications.
Ergo · vol. 4, no. 25 · 2017
720 · Wolfgang Schwarz
With the transition model in place, there is an obvious two-step process for
computing the probabilities over the new world state at t+1 in the light of new
evidence: first, the previous probability over states at time t is projected forward
to t +1 by the transition model; then the result is conditionalized on the new
evidence.
Unfortunately, presentations of this approach tend to remain unclear on points
that are central to our present topic. For example, equation (15.5) in (Rus-
sell & Norvig 2010: 572)—which in this respect is representative of the entire
literature—expresses the complete update by the following equation:
P(Xt+1/e1, . . . , et+1) = αP(et+1/Xt+1)∑
xt
P(Xt+1/xt)P(xt/e1, . . . , et). (RN)
Here, P(Xt+1/e1, . . . , et+1) is meant to be the agent’s probability at time t+1 over
possible world states Xt+1, after having received evidence e1, . . . , et+1 at times
1 through t +1; P(et+1/Xt+1) is the probability of the (sensory) evidence et+1
given state Xt+1, as specified by the agent’s “sensor model”; P(Xt+1/xt) is the
probability of Xt+1 given a particular hypothesis xt about the previous state, as
specified by the transition model; P(xt/e1, . . . , et) is the agent’s previous credence
in xt; α is a normalizing constant (the denominator in the application of Bayes’
Theorem to compute conditionalization).
Since we are interested in how subjective probabilities should evolve over
time, it is advisable to use different labels for the probabilities at different times—
‘Crt+1’ and ‘Crt’, rather than simply ‘P’. Dealing with ideal agents, we can
assume that the agent’s probability measure at any time incorporates the evi-
dence she has received up to then, so there is no need to explicitly conditionalize
these measures on the history of evidence; we can write ‘Crt(Xt)’ instead of
‘P(Xt/e1, . . . , et)’. Moreover, having added time indices to the probability mea-
sures, we should arguably remove them from the objects of probability, to make
clear that Crt and Crt+1 can assign probabilities to centred world states (like there
being two apples in the basket), not just to uncentred propositions specifying the
state of the world at a given time (there being two apples in the basket at t). This fits
the informal discussion in Russell and Norvig (2010) and elsewhere, and in any
case is required for the present proposal to bear on our topic.
The transition model specifies how world states may change from one point
of time to the next. We could represent this by a primitive binary probability
measure over centred propositions, but it will be useful to make the content of
the relevant attitudes more explicit. After all, what is captured by the transition
model are ordinary conditional beliefs about how the world may change: about
whether B is going to be true given that A is true now. To model these beliefs, I
will ignore matters of computational tractability and assume that the agent has
a joint probability measure over the present state of the world, its past, and its
future. I will continue to assume that time is linear and discrete, so that any
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centred world in the algebra of propositions fixes all relevant facts about the
present state, its ancestors, and descendants.
The following piece of notation proves useful. For any centred world w and
integer n, let w+n be an otherwise identical world in which the centre is shifted n
units of time into the future. How this is cashed out depends on the construction
of centred worlds. For example, if centred worlds are triples of an uncentred
world, an individual, and a time, then (u, i, t)+n may be (u, i, t + n); if centred
worlds are sentences, then the +n operation prefixes the relevant sentence with
‘in n units of time’. (We’ll come to reconsider this interpretation of w+n in Section
6.) For any set A of centred worlds, let
A+n = {w+n : w ∈ A}.
The shifting operator +n allows us to make explicit the agent’s transition
model, her beliefs about how the world may change. For example, if the agent
at t is 90% confident that it is going to rain in one unit of time given that it is
raining now, then Crt(rain+1/rain) = .9.
Now return to the two-step update described by (RN). The first step was
to project the probabilities from t to t +1 by the transition model. The shifting
operation makes this step easy to define: the new probability of any centred
proposition A is simply the old probability of A+1. For example, if Crt assigns
probability .9 to rain+1 (‘it is going to rain in 1 unit of time’), then the updated
probability assigns probability .9 to rain (‘it is raining now’). Let’s denote the
shifted probability measure that results from this step by ‘Cr+1t ’. The concept
obviously generalizes to larger (and negative) intervals:
Cr+nt (A) = Crt(A
+n).
In the second step, the shifted probability measure is conditionalized on the
evidence. If the evidence is captured by a (possibly centred) proposition E that
is learnt with certainty, the whole update therefore looks as follows:
Crt+1(A) = Cr+1t (A/E) = Crt(A
+1/E+1). (SC)
Since the second step is plain old conditionalization, generalizations to cases of
uncertain and equivocal evidence are straightforward.
(SC) is the natural interpretation of (RN) if we assume that the objects of cre-
dence can be centred. In philosophy, (SC) has been defended in Meacham (2010),
Schwarz (2012), and (2015).14 In Schwarz (2012) and (2015) I show that (SC) in-
14. Schulz (2010) defends essentially the same rule, without isolating shifting as a separate
step, and restricts it to cases where the agent keeps track of time. (I will turn to this issue in
the next section.) Kim (2009) defends a similarly restricted norm with a similar form but where
the relative shifts are replaced by shifts to an absolute time: Crt+1(A) = Crt(A at i/E at i),
provided the agent is certain at t+1 that the present time is i. Kim does not explain where the
agent’s new beliefs about the time come from.
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herits many features of conditionalization if the probability space is extended by
centred propositions. For example, Cr+1t (·/E) maximizes expected future accu-
racy, and agents are vulnerable to diachronic Dutch Books if and only if they
violate (SC).
(SC) correctly deals with all our fruit basket examples. Recall that imaging
accounts seemed to give the right result in the original case, assuming that the
new information, that there are no bananas in the basket, is interpreted as in-
formation about an intervention: that somebody went ahead and removed any
bananas from the basket. Since this is not equivalent to the simpler proposition
that there are no bananas in the basket, we should include a corresponding event
in the probability space. So the space should include events A (one apple, no
banana), AA (two apples, no banana), AB (one apple, one banana), and BR (any
bananas removed). To apply (SC), we also need A+1, AA+1, AB+1 and BR+1 so
that we can model your beliefs at t about how the world might change. Let’s
assume that at time t you were neutral not only about whether there are two ap-
ples or an apple and a banana in the basket, but also about whether any bananas
were going to be removed. Moreover, you regarded the two issues as indepen-
dent, and you were certain that if the bananas won’t be removed then all fruits
will remain in the basket.15 Then
Crt(AA+1 ∧ BR+1) = Cr+1t (AA ∧ BR) = .25
Crt(AA+1 ∧ ¬BR+1) = Cr+1t (AA ∧ ¬BR) = .25
Crt(A+1 ∧ BR+1) = Cr+1t (A ∧ BR) = .25
Crt(AB+1 ∧ ¬BR+1) = Cr+1t (AB ∧ ¬BR) = .25
Conditionalizing the shifted probability Cr+1t on BR leaves you with Crt+1(AA) =
Crt+1(A) = .5. So (SC) still gets this case right. But it also applies, and gives sen-
sible results, in cases where imaging accounts fall silent. For example, if BT is the
proposition that a banana has been taken from the basket, Crt(AA+1 ∧ BT+1) = 0,
and so Crt+1(A) = 1.
So far, so good. Unfortunately, there are cases which (SC) seems to get wrong,
notably cases where the agent loses track of time.
5. Losing Track of Time
If I have not just looked at a clock, I usually don’t know the exact time. This
suggests that I am not updating my credences in accordance with (SC). To see
why, imagine for the sake of vividness that the units of discrete time are min-
15. All these assumptions intuitively should affect the result of the update; it is an advantage
of (SC) over (I) that they have to be made explicit.
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utes. Suppose at t an agent is certain that it is noon: Crt(12:00) = 1. Presum-
ably, she can also be certain that in one minute it will be one minute past noon:
Crt(12:01+1) = 1. If the agent follows (SC), she will then be certain at one minute
past noon that it is one minute past noon (assuming that she does not receive ev-
idence with probability 0): Crt+1(12:01) = Crt(12:01+1) = 1. In general, if an
agent knows what time it is at any point and they update their beliefs in accor-
dance with (SC), it seems that they will forever know the time.
Is this a problem? The classical norms of Bayesianism are norms for ideal
agents with unlimited and perfectly reliable cognitive capacities. Real agents
can’t conditionalize complex probability measures in an instant; they can’t com-
pute the expected utility of all their options at every moment; they can’t instanta-
neously see through all consequences of their beliefs; they can’t retain everything
they ever learned. All that does not undermine the relevant norms as constraints
of ideal rationality. Nor does it make contemplating such norms pointless. For
one thing, ignoring cognitive limitations helps to simplify formal models (like
ignoring friction and air resistance in physics). In addition, the ideal case can
provide useful guidance when thinking about non-ideal cases.
So one might hold that my losing track of time is just a consequence of my
cognitive limitations: cognitively ideal agents don’t lose track of time.
The problem with this view is that it is false. Consider a time traveller who
enters a time machine that she knows will take her either 100 or 200 years into
the future. Upon arrival (without further evidence), the time traveller will be
lost in time, even if she has unlimited cognitive resources. Similarly, consider an
astronaut travelling to another star and back at a very fast but unknown speed.
Arriving back on Earth, she can’t know without further evidence how much
time has passed on Earth, since that depends on the unknown velocity of her
spaceship (according to Special Relativity). Or consider sleep—the poor man’s
version of time travel into the future. If you wake up from a surprising noise
in the middle of the night, even unlimited cognitive resources won’t help you to
figure out the time. One might respond that cognitively ideal agents don’t sleep,
don’t travel at unknown speed, and don’t enter time machines without knowing
the destination, but that is getting silly.
Note that the problem is not that (SC) gives wrong results in cases where
agents lose track of time. The problem is that (SC) seems to disallow such cases
from arising in the first place.
Can we generalize (SC) to make room for agents who lose track of time? One
way of doing that leads to the proposal of Santorio (2011) and Spohn (in press).
On this approach, (SC) is the right norm only if the agent is certain that one unit
of time has passed since the earlier belief state. For the more general case, we
assume that the agent can at least assign a probability to different hypotheses
about how much time has passed. Suppose she gives 80% credence to the hy-
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pothesis that 1 unit of time has passed and 20% to the hypothesis that 2 units
have passed. Instead of moving the probability mass of each centred world w to
the corresponding world w+1, the shifting step then divides the mass between
w+1 and w+2, with the former receiving 80% and the latter 20%. In general, let
τ be a probability distribution over natural numbers representing the agent’s be-
lief about how many units of time have passed (still assuming that time is linear
and discrete). To shift the original credence function by τ, the probability of any
world w is then given by
Crτt (w) =∑
n
Crt(w+n)τ(n). (GI)
In the second step, the agent conditionalizes on her new evidence, like before:
Crt′ (A) = Cr
τ
t (A/E). (SC′)
(I use ‘Crt′ ’ to denote the new credence function rather than ‘Crt+1’ because we
no longer assume that the new credence is located 1 unit of time after Crt.)
To complete the proposal, we need to say where τ comes from. How does the
agent arrive at a probability measure over how much time has passed since the
earlier credence? The simplest answer, suggested by both Santorio and Spohn,
is that τ comes from the agent’s sensory evidence at t′, delivered by a special
“sense of time”.16
Let us grant for the sake of discussion that all rational agents have a sense of
time—although that strikes me as equally implausible as the claim that rational-
ity requires having eyes. Let us also not worry how the earlier time is represented
by this sense—although I do worry about that.17 The main problem with (SC′) is
that it often gives verdicts that are clearly wrong.
Before I give an example, observe that (SC′) takes a step back towards the
imaging approach. For if there is a proposition that 1 unit of time has passed (which
we didn’t assume in Section 4, but have to assume now), then Cr+1t is the image
of Crt on that proposition (assuming the “closest world” to w at which 1 unit of
16. Moss (2012) also appeals to a sense of time for a similar purpose. Like (SC′), her
proposal combines a shifting-like step with subsequent conditionalization; like Santorio and
Spohn, she appeals to a sense of time for the first step. But on Moss’s account, the first step
does not take the form (GI). Instead, the agent completely discards her earlier self-locating
beliefs and uses the sense of time (in a manner not fully explained) to locate herself in absolute
time.
17. Spohn suggests that the sense of time delivers qualitative information, for example,
that 2 minutes have passed since the red flag was waved and 3 minutes have passed since the green
flag was waved. But what if the earlier time t is not distinguished by special features known
with certainty to the agent? Also, how does the update process determine which of these
qualitatively described times is the time of the earlier credence? According to Santorio and
Moss, the earlier time is identified directly, de re. Here, too, I wonder how the update process
knows which of the times given in that way is the time of the earlier credence.
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time has passed is w+1): shifting turns into imaging. Indeed, (GI) is equivalent
to generalized imaging as introduced in Gärdenfors (1982) and Lewis (1981) for
cases where there may be more than one “most similar” world. In contrast to
the imaging accounts from Section 3, (SC′) does not image the previous credence
function on the total new evidence. The previous credence is imaged only on
the evidence about how much time has passed. One might hope that this avoids
the problems for the imaging account, because the information about how much
time has passed—understood as purely temporal information that doesn’t even
entail that the agent still exists—may be hoped to reveal nothing about what the
world was like before.18
But a similar problem remains. Consider the following scenario.
You’re about to be put into an artificial coma for emergency surgery. If
the surgery succeeds, you will wake up after a day. If it fails, you will
wake up after 10 days. You know all this, and you rationally give credence
0.9 to the hypothesis that the surgery will fail. Your inner sense of time
is not attuned to comas, so upon awakening it suggests to you that not
much more than a day or two have passed. You have no further evidence
at this point about whether the surgery succeeded.
Let’s assume for concreteness that your sense of time assigns probability 1/2n to
the hypothesis that n days have passed; so τ(1) = 1/2 and τ(10) = 1/1024. Let
S be the hypothesis that the surgery either will succeed or has succeeded, and
let D1, D2, D3, . . . , be the hypotheses that you were in the coma for 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
days, respectively. At t, before you were put into the coma, your credence in S
was 0.1. Shifting by (GI) leads to the following probabilities:
Crτt (S ∧ D1) = 0.1× 1/2 = 0.05
Crτt (¬S ∧ D1) = 0.9× 1/2 = 0.45
. . .
Crτt (S ∧ D10) = 0.1× 1/1024 ≈ 0.0001
Crτt (¬S ∧ D10) = 0.9× 1/1024 ≈ 0.0009.
. . .
Notice that the shifted credence function assigns significant probability to possi-
bilities like ¬S ∧ D1 in which you are not awake. (If we replace the time in the
18. Arguably, the information that so-and-so much time has passed still entails that the
world hasn’t come to an end in the meantime, and thus reveals that the previous state of the
world was not a terminal state. Terminal world states also pose problems for (SC): what is
w+1 if w is terminal? I will ignore these problems and assume that the agents in question give
negligible credence to the hypothesis that the world (or their life) is just about to end; see
Meacham (2010: Section 4.1) and Schwarz (2015: 667, Footnote 8).
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coma with genuine time travel, you wouldn’t even exist at the relevant centred
worlds.) These possibilities must be ruled out in the next step of the update,
where you conditionalize. Your post-awakening evidence plausibly reveals to
you that you are awake and that you have just woken up from the coma. Thus it
concentrates all probability on S∧D1 and ¬S∧D10. As a result, you will become
highly confident that the surgery was a success:
Crt′ (S ∧ D1) ≈ 0.9827
Crt′ (¬S ∧ D10) ≈ 0.0173.
This is the wrong result. Knowing that your sense of time is not to be trusted,
your credence in the surgery having been a success should remain close to the
previous level, at around 0.1.
The coma example is not an isolated special case. Our inner sense of time is
not perfectly calibrated to the actual passage of time, and we know that its reli-
ability, and the direction in which it errs, depends on the circumstances: during
some activities, time seems to fly by, during others it almost comes to a standstill.
We cannot blindly trust our sense of time.
What if we don’t identify τ in (SC′) with the output of an agent’s sense of
time, but with the agent’s all-things-considered credence about how much time
has passed, based on her sense of time together with any other relevant informa-
tion she may have? (SC′) then collapses into contradiction. To illustrate, return
to the coma case and suppose that at t′ your all-things-considered credence in
D1 and D10 is 0.1 and 0.9 respectively (as seems reasonable). (GI) then moves
probability 0.9× 0.9 = 0.81 to ¬S ∧ D10 worlds, and 0.1× 0.1 = 0.01 to S ∧ D1
worlds. Conditionalizing on the information that you’ve woken up excludes all
other possibilities, so Crt′ (D10) ≈ 0.988 and Crt′ (D1) ≈ 0.012—contradicting the
assumption that your t′ credence in D1 and D10 is 0.1 and 0.9 respectively.19
Schulz (2010) suggests a different generalization of (SC) that gets around the
problem. Let τ represent the agent’s all-things-considered credence (at t′) about
how much time has passed. Then Schulz suggests to replace (SC) by (SC∗):
Crt′ (A) =∑
n
τ(n)Crt(A+n/E+n). (SC∗)
In the coma example, where E is your post-awakening evidence, Crt(S+1/E+1)
is plausibly 1 and Crt(S+10/E+10) is 0, for you are sure that the surgery succeeds
19. The only way to get Crt′ (D10) = 0.9 and Crt′ (D1) = 0.1 out of (SC′) is to assume that τ
assigns equal probability to D10 and D1. In general, (SC′) often gives plausible verdicts if τ is
uniform over all possible time shifts. The shifting step then makes the agent completely lost in
time; to find her new location in time, the agent must draw on her (remaining) evidence. With
uniform τ, (SC′) effectively belongs to the family of proposals discussed in Section 2 on which
diachronic norms only pertain to uncentred beliefs.
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iff you wake up after one day. With τ(1) = 0.1 and τ(10) = 0.9, we therefore get
the desired result:
Crt′ (S) = 0.1× 1 + 0.9× 0 = 0.1.
In contrast to (SC) and (SC′), (SC∗) can no longer be divided into a shifting step
and a conditionalization step.20
Schulz’s proposal escapes the coma problem, but it gives wrong results in
other cases, such as the following variant of the Sleeping Beauty problem, not
involving any threat of memory erasure.21
After you go to sleep on Sunday, a fair coin will be tossed. If it lands
heads, you will be made to sleep through until Tuesday morning, when
you will be awakened by the sound of a bell. If the coin lands tails, you
will be awakened on Monday by the cry of a rooster and on Tuesday by
the sound of a bell. (Nobody will tamper with your memories.) You are
aware of all these facts when you fall asleep on Sunday. After a deep and
dreamless sleep, you find yourself waking up to the sound of a bell.
It should be uncontroversial that you ought to become confident that it is Tuesday
and that the coin landed heads. After all, if the coin had landed tails, your
next awakening would have been to the cry of a rooster (and you would have
retained your memories of that awakening). Using days as temporal units, this
means that τ(1) = 0 and τ(2) = 1; by (SC∗), it follows that CrTue(Heads) =
1 × CrSun(Heads+2/E+2). But you already knew on Sunday that you would be
awakened by a bell in two days time. So if your relevant sensory evidence E is the
sound of the bell (or your awakening by that sound), then CrSun(Heads
+2/E+2) =
1/2; so (SC∗) falsely entails that upon awakening, you should give equal credence
to heads and tails.22
Another obvious drawback of (SC∗) is that it takes the agent’s all-things-
considered credence about how much time has passed as given. How is the agent
20. Kim (2009) proposes a similar generalization to (SC) but with absolute time shifts:
Crt′ (A) = ∑i Crt′ (now = i)Crt(A at i/E at i), where i ranges over points of time. (Notice that
this only makes use of the agent’s uncentred opinions at t.) The following counterexample to
(SC∗) is also a counterexample to Kim’s proposal, modulo the remark in Footnote 22 below.
21. The original Sleeping Beauty problem, introduced in Piccione and Rubinstein (1997)
and Elga (2000), is outside the scope of the present survey, as it is not a case in which an agent
has unlimited and perfectly reliable cognitive capacities: if Beauty’s coin lands tails, she cannot
obey any substantive diachronic norms in the transition from Monday to Tuesday. The answer
to the Sleeping Beauty problem therefore depends not only on the norms for ideal updates—the
topic of the present paper—but also on the norms for how to compensate for a threat to one’s
ideal (diachronic) rationality (compare Arntzenius 2002).
22. To be fair, Schulz does not say whether E is to be understood as sensory evidence or
as a more comprehensive kind of evidence that includes the information that you were not
awakened by a rooster the day before (which, as I hereby stipulate, is not part of your sensory
evidence).
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supposed to arrive at these beliefs? Obviously not by (SC∗). But beliefs about
how much time have passed are highly constrained by the agent’s previous belief
state and her sensory evidence. As it stands, (SC∗) is therefore at best part of the
full story about ideal diachronic rationality—even setting aside that it gets some
cases wrong and relies on a questionable ability to pick out the previous time.23
Fortunately, we can say more. To do so, let’s pause to reconsider exactly what
update rules like (C) or (SC) or (SC∗) are supposed to tell us.
6. Shifting in Personal Time
Conditionalization, understood as an update rule, relates two epistemic states:
an “old” state and a “new” state. Schematically, it says that the credences of an
agent A2 at time t2 should equal the credences of an agent A1 at t1 conditional
on A2’s evidence at t2. But not any pair of agents and times falls in the rule’s
domain of application. For example, conditionalization plausibly doesn’t say
that your credence now should equal my credence in 5 hours conditional on your
present evidence. The rule only applies if A2 at t2 stands in a special relation to
A1 at t1. What is that relation?
As a necessary condition, one might suggest that A1 must be identical to A2:
update rules like (C) are meant to tell us how an agent’s later beliefs should be
related to the same agent’s earlier beliefs. But even that may be questioned. For
example, a common view in the metaphysics of personal identity is that persons
cannot survive episodes of fission; yet there are plausibly norms on how beliefs
should change across fission (see, e.g., Meacham 2010: 93f, Hedden 2015: 455–
458, Schwarz 2015).
What about the relevant times, t1 and t2? If we work with a sensory con-
ception of evidence, then t1 and t2 can’t be arbitrary times. For remember that
sensory evidence is not cumulative: an agent’s sensory evidence at one time is
generally not part of her sensory evidence at later times. Consequently, what an
agent should believe at some point t2 is not a function of her credence at an arbi-
trary earlier time t1 and her (sensory) evidence at t2, because the new credence
should also reflect the evidence received in between t1 and t2. That’s why condi-
tionalization is often described as relating an agent’s belief state right before the
information E is received to the agent’s belief state right after E has been taken
into account. But what exactly does that mean? How, for example, does it apply
to a time traveller for whom the old state may well be in the future of the new
state?
I will not explore these questions any further. I bring them up only to empha-
23. Titelbaum (2016) points out an analogous gap in Kim (2009), but falsely suggests that it
affects all shifting accounts.
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size that stepwise diachronic norms like conditionalization are relative to an epis-
temic successor relation between epistemic states, or agents-at-times: we should
not read ‘Crt’ and ‘Crt+1’ in (C) as invariably picking out the credence function
of the same agent at successive points in objective time, given by atomic clocks.
Rather, ‘Crt’ and ‘Crt+1’ pick out credence functions of epistemically successive
epistemic states, whatever exactly that means. In effect, the epistemic successor
relation defines a kind of personal time (compare Lewis 1976b) relative to which
the indices in ‘Crt’ and ‘Crt+1’ should be understood.
Now return to the simple shifting rule from Section 4.
Crt+1(A) = Cr+1t (A/E) = Crt(A
+1/E+1). (SC)
When I suggested that the rule fails to allow for agents who lose track of time,
I assumed that shifting goes by objective time: that w+1 is w with the centre
moved one unit of objective time into the future. But that makes little sense if
the new belief state is not always located one unit of time in the future. (If a time
traveller instantaneously travels from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m., knowing at departure
that it is 4 p.m. and that she will arrive at 6 p.m., then her next belief update
should not make her certain that it is 4.01 p.m.)˙ A more sensible interpretation
of (SC) re-uses the epistemic successor relation to define shifting: w+1 is w with
the centre moved to the epistemic successor of the epistemic state on which w is
centred. This is how (SC) is interpreted in Meacham (2010) and Schwarz (2015).
On that interpretation, (SC) gives the right verdicts even in time travel cases
and situations where agents lose track of time; there is no need to explore more
general rules like (SC′) or (SC∗).
The details now depend on the epistemic successor relation. But we don’t
need to settle every conceivable trouble case before we can start applying the
rule. Assume as before that we’re dealing with agents who update their belief
state instantaneously and in discrete steps, and let’s ignore the possibility of
fission and fusion. Each update, let’s assume, is a causal process that produces a
new belief state based on the previous state and the current (sensory) evidence.
What we want to know from an update rule is how the newly produced credences
should relate to the pre-update credences and the new evidence. So we can
identify the epistemic successor relation with the “update relation” that holds
between states S1 and S2 just in case S2 is the result of an update applied to S1
(as suggested in Schwarz 2012).
Let’s see how (SC), on the new interpretation, handles the coma example.
The shifting step plausibly moves the probability of every pre-coma world to the
next post-coma world, as that is when the next belief update takes place. For
worlds in which the surgery is a success, the shift covers 1 day; for worlds in
which the surgery fails, it covers 10 days. (By contrast, (SC′) indiscriminately
shifted all worlds by the same amount.) The shifted credence thus still assigns
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probability 0.1 to the surgery having succeeded, and since the new evidence is
neutral on the success of the surgery, this is the final credence.
We also get the right result in the Sleeping Beauty variant. Here the shifted
Sunday credence is evenly divided between Heads & Tuesday & Bell worlds and
Tails & Monday & Rooster worlds; subsequent conditionalizing on Bell makes you
certain that it is Tuesday and that the coin landed heads.
So (SC) looks like a good replacement for conditionalization if centred propo-
sitions are allowed. It is well-motivated, correctly deals with all the examples we
have considered, and displays many of the same abstract features that character-
ize conditionalization for uncentred credences. (SC) does not deny that we have
a sense of time, but it also doesn’t make that a requirement of rationality. If an
agent has such a sense, it enters the update process like any other sense, in the
conditionalization step.
The main downside of (SC), in comparison to the other rules we’ve consid-
ered, is that it puts more weight on the epistemic successor relation. Real agents,
you may worry, do not update their beliefs discretely and instantaneously. How
should we understand the successor relation, and consequently the shifting op-
eration, for such agents?
Now, as mentioned above, there are continuous generalizations of (SC). But I
doubt that this fully resolves the worry. In either form, (SC) is at best an idealized
model of belief update, a model that does not simply and directly map onto real
agents. Arguably the same is true of Bayesianism in general. We talk about
agents’ credences, but what does it take for a concrete lump of flesh or silicon
to have a given credence function? If we make (SC) (or indeed (C)) part of the
Bayesian model, then mapping the model to the world requires invoking some
criterion for dividing an agent’s epistemic history into discrete stages. In practice,
this rarely poses serious problems. Remember that the reason why update rules
need to relate immediately successive belief states is that we don’t want to miss
relevant evidence acquired at intermediate times. If we’re only interested in
modelling an agent’s credence about a given subject matter, we can therefore
ignore times at which the agent receives no evidence relevant to that subject
matter.24 So quite coarse-grained successor relations are often sufficient.
To illustrate, recall the application of (SC) to the original fruit basket scenario
at the end of Section 4. To model the update, we needed no more than twelve
centred worlds and one step of shifting, from before you learned that any ba-
nanas had been removed to afterwards. It does not matter whether the learning
event was really instantaneous; we can even take the “old” state to be an hour
before the learning event and the “new” state to be an hour afterwards, provided
you acquire no other relevant news about the fruit basket in these intervals.
24. Some care is required because evidence that may appear irrelevant at the time (when it
is received) can retrospectively become relevant in the light of later evidence.
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You may also worry that (SC) still requires agents to keep perfect track of
time, albeit only of personal time. This is true, in the following sense. Suppose
at some point an agent is certain that A is true now and at no other point in time.
If she updates in accordance with (SC), her successor stage will then be certain
of A−1; after n updates, she will be certain of A−n. Informally speaking, she will
know that A was true n “units of personal time” in the past. Couldn’t the agent
become unsure how much personal time has passed since A?
She certainly could. The question is whether this would involve a failure of
ideal diachronic rationality, and it is at least arguable that it would. If before
falling asleep you know that it is raining, and upon awakening you’re unsure
whether it was raining before, then you’ve lost information. Diachronically ideal
agents don’t lose information. To be sure, there are situations where agents can’t
help but lose information. (SC) is not applicable to such cases. But the same is
true for (C). If there is a problem here, it is arguably independent of the problem
posed by centred propositions.
Note also that personal time is not a mysterious objective quantity knowledge
of which would require special sensory capacities. There is a tendency to think of
belief update as a kind of reasoning the agent is supposed to go through at t+1:
“Here’s my earlier credence function Crt; here’s my new evidence E; now how
do I combine these to compute my updated credence?” From that perspective,
the earlier credence would have to be picked out in some way or other, and the
agent would have to know that it is indeed the credence of her predecessor state.
But update rules like (C) or (SC) are not norms for how agents should reason at
t+1. They rather specify how an agent’s beliefs should evolve from one time to
another. It does not matter if the agent recalls her earlier credences, and if so
under what mode of presentation.
7. Cumulative evidence
In Section 2, I mentioned that some authors have resisted introducing centred ob-
jects of credence. A common motivation for the resistance is the alleged fact that
doing so would make the dynamics of rational credence intractable. Stalnaker,
for example, asserts that “centred-worlds models . . . provided no resources for
representing the relations between informational states across time and across
persons, and so no resources for clarifying the dynamics of knowledge and be-
lief” (2008: 64). We have seen that such skepticism is unfounded. With credences
extended to centred propositions, the shifting rule (SC) can play essentially the
same role that conditionalization played in classical Bayesianism. Ironically, the
centred-worlds model allows us to present a clearer (or at least, more complete)
picture of diachronic rationality than Stalnaker’s own model.
To conclude, I want to return to another idea from Section 2: that we might
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replace diachronic norms by (partly or entirely) synchronic norms. On the sim-
plest proposal along these lines, an agent’s credence function at any time should
equal some ur-prior P conditional on the agent’s evidence at that time. I have
argued that these views require an unexplained non-sensory conception of evi-
dence and thus don’t provide a full answer if we want to know how an agent’s
credences should evolve as time goes by and new information arrives from her
senses. I also suggested that the problem of updating centred beliefs reappears
as a problem about updating non-sensory evidence: how does your sensory evi-
dence that it is raining transform into your later non-sensory evidence that is was
raining?
Drawing on the lessons from Sections 4–6, we can now solve the problem of
updating non-sensory evidence.
For simplicity, I will focus on cases where evidence is conclusive.25 So assume
an agent receives sensory evidence E1, E2, . . . , En−1, En at successive points in her
personal time. Arguably, if your sensory evidence is E and you optimally pre-
serve that information, then the successor of your present epistemic state should
be certain of E−1: that E was the case “one unit of personal time in the past”.26
So we may define the agent’s cumulative evidence at the point when she receives
sensory evidence En as E
−(n−1)
1 ∧ E−(n−2)2 ∧ . . . ∧ E−1n−1 ∧ En.
How does updating by (SC) compare to ur-prior conditionalization on cu-
mulative evidence, as just defined? In classical Bayesianism, where centred
25. Aggregating inconclusive evidence raises further issues. In particular, how should
we even represent an agent’s history of inconclusive evidence? A convenient choice is to list
the relevant evidence partitions associated not with their Jeffrey weights but with their Bayes
factors (compare Field 1978), for the effect of stepwise Jeffrey conditioning on some partitions
with associated Bayes factors can be mimicked by Jeffrey conditioning on the intersection of
these partitions, with Bayes factors determined by the original Bayes factors. (With Jeffrey
weights this is not possible because the final probability—the Jeffrey weight—of cells in the
refined partition generally depends not just on the Jeffrey weights in the individual updates
but also on the agent’s prior credence.) To allow for centred propositions, the Bayes factors
should be replaced by shifted Bayes factors
Cr′(A)/Cr′(B)
Cr(A+1)/Cr(B+1)
.
One might object that evidence partitions with associated (shifted) Bayes factors are not an
adequate representation of the agent’s evidence on the grounds that the Bayes factors at a
certain point in an evidence history depend not only on the given sensory experience, but also
on the agent’s priors and on the experiences she had earlier (see, e.g., Garber 1980; Weisberg
2009). I see no way to avoid the dependence on earlier experiences, but at least the dependence
on prior credence can be mitigated by fixing the prior (i.e., the initial probability reflected in
the Bayes factors of an evidence history) as the ur-prior.
26. As before, the interpretation of the epistemic successor relation and thus of personal
time may depend on the modelling purpose; you don’t need to conceptualize E−1 in terms of
personal time.
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propositions are ignored, the result of successively updating on E1, E2, . . . , En
is identical to conditionalizing the initial credence function on the conjunction of
E1, E2, . . . , En. One might similarly conjecture that successive application of (SC)
to an agent’s sensory evidence leads to the same result as conditionalizing the
initial credence function on the agent’s final cumulative evidence.
As I show in the appendix, the conjecture holds only under non-trivial as-
sumptions. In particular, we need something like the following stationarity as-
sumption (a special case of the principle of self-locating indifference defended in
Arntzenius & Dorr 2017, Bostrom 2002, and Elga 2004):
Whenever a centred world w′ is a successor of a centred world w, then
any rational initial credence function Cr0 assigns equal probability to w
and w′.
Given stationarity (and linearity—no fission or fusion—which I’ve assumed
throughout), if an agent’s credence function at any time equals some ur-prior
P conditional on her cumulative evidence at the time, then the agent updates
her beliefs by (SC). Conversely, if an agent starts out with P and from then
on updates by (SC), then her credence at any time equals P conditional on her
cumulative evidence. The two accounts describe the same dynamics.
There might still be reasons to prefer one over the other. One might prefer
the ur-prior formulation on the grounds that it more easily generalizes to cases
where agents lose information. My own view is that it does not, and that ur-
prior conditionalization gives wrong verdicts in unusual cases when stationarity
or linearity fail. But that is a story for another occasion.
Appendix
I will first show that if stationarity holds (as well as a minor further assumption
that I will introduce in a moment), then successive updating on sensory evidence
in accordance with (SC) yields the same result as conditionalizing the agent’s
initial credence Cr0 on her cumulative evidence.
Let E1, . . . , En be the sensory evidence the agent receives at personal times
1, . . . , n, respectively. With a little algebra, it is easy to show that if the agent
follows (SC), then for any proposition A,
Crn(A) = Cr0(A+n/E+11 ∧ . . . ∧ E+nn ). (1)
Since the agent’s cumulative evidence at point n is E−(n−1)1 ∧ . . .∧ E−1n−1 ∧ En, what
we have to show is (2).
Cr0(A+n/E+11 ∧ . . . ∧ E+nn ) = Cr0(A/E−(n−1)1 ∧ . . . ∧ E−1n−1 ∧ En). (2)
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The further assumption we need besides stationarity is that E1 is incompat-
ible with the present state being an agent’s initial state—that is, her state before
receiving any evidence. This can be captured by (3), where > is the tautology:
Cr0(E1 ⊃ >−1) = 1. (3)
To see why (3) is needed, suppose Cr0 assigns
• probability .4 to an initial A ∧ E1 world,
• probability .4 to its successor, a terminal ¬A ∧ ¬E1 world,
• probability .1 to an initial A ∧ ¬E1 world, and
• probability .1 to its successor, a terminal ¬A ∧ E1 world.
Then Cr0(A+1/E+11 ) = 0 but Cr0(A/E) = .8, which violates (2). (3) could perhaps
be motivated by the fact that an agent’s total new evidence generally includes
higher-order evidence about the agent’s beliefs. Alternatively, instead of (3) we
could assume that even an agent’s initial credence Cr0 is given by conditionaliz-
ing a merely hypothetical ur-prior P on some initial evidence E0, which would
play the role of > in what follows.
To prove (2), observe that for any propositions A0, A1, . . . , An, any centred
world that satisfies A0 ∧ A+11 ∧ . . .∧ A+nn is succeeded by a world that is succeeded
by a world . . . (n times) . . . that satisfies A−n0 ∧ A−(n−1)1 ∧ . . . ∧ An; conversely, any
world that satisfies A−n0 ∧ A−(n−1)1 ∧ . . . ∧ An is n-preceded by a world that satis-
fies A−n0 ∧ A−(n−1)1 ∧ . . . ∧ An; by linearity (no fission and fusion), this mapping
from worlds to worlds is one-one; by stationarity, the worlds it pairs always have
equal probability. Thus for any propositions A0, A1, . . . , An,
Cr0(A0 ∧ A+11 ∧ . . . ∧ A+nn ) = Cr0(A−n0 ∧ A−(n−1)1 ∧ . . . ∧ An). (4)
Two instances of this equality are (5) and (6).
Cr0(>∧ E+11 ∧ . . . ∧ E+nn ) = Cr0(>−n ∧ E−(n−1)1 ∧ . . . ∧ En). (5)
Cr0(>∧ E+11 ∧ . . . ∧ E+nn ∧ A+n) = Cr0(>−n ∧ E−(n−1)1 ∧ . . . ∧ En ∧ A). (6)
By (3), Cr0(E1 ↔ (>−1 ∧ E1)) = 1, so we can remove > from the conjunctions
in (5) and (6). By the ratio formula for conditional probability, (5) and (6) then
entail (2).
Technically, (2) can be true even in the absence of stationarity. For example,
different ur-priors of successive worlds could happen to balance out so as to
preserve (4). So there are slightly weaker assumptions that would also do the job.
But I can’t think of any motivation for these assumptions that would not equally
support stationarity.
Ergo · vol. 4, no. 25 · 2017
Diachronic Norms for Self-Locating Beliefs · 735
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Michael Titelbaum and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
References
Alchourrón, Carlos E., Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (1985). On the
Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Functions for Contraction and Revi-
sion. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50(2), 510–530.
Arntzenius, Frank (2002). Reflections on Sleeping Beauty. Analysis, 62(273), 53–
62.
Arntzenius, Frank and Cian Dorr (2017). Self-Locating Priors and Cosmological
Measures. In Khalil Chamcham, John Barrow, Simon Saunders, and Joe Silk
(Eds.), The Philosophy of Cosmology (396–428). Cambridge University Press.
Bostrom, Nick (2002). Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and
Philosophy. Routledge.
Boutilier, Craig (1998). A Unified Model of Qualitative Belief Change: A Dynam-
ical Systems Perspective. Artificial Intelligence, 98(1–2), 281–316.
Bradley, Darren (2013). Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time. In Alessandro
Capone and Neil Feit (Eds.), Attitudes De Se (291–306). University of Chicago
Press.
Briggs, Rachael (2010). Putting a Value on Beauty. In Tamar Gendler and John
Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Vol. 3, 3–34). Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Cappelen, Herman and Josh Dever (2013). The Inessential Indexical. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Christensen, David (1992). Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology.
Philosophy of Science, 59(4), 540–557.
Christensen, David (2000). Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality.
The Philosophical Review, 109(3), 349–371.
Elga, Adam (2000). Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Anal-
ysis, 60(2), 143–147.
Elga, Adam (2004). Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 69(2), 383–396.
Field, Hartry (1978). A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization. Philosophy of Science,
45(3), 361–367.
Garber, Daniel (1980). Field and Jeffrey Conditionalization. Philosophy of Science,
47(1), 142–145.
Gärdenfors, Peter (1982). Imaging and Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophy,
79(12), 747–760.
Greaves, Hilary and David Wallace (2006). Justifying Conditionalization: Condi-
Ergo · vol. 4, no. 25 · 2017
736 · Wolfgang Schwarz
tionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility. Mind, 115(459), 607–632.
Halpern, Joseph (2006). Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflec-
tion in Asynchronous Systems. In Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (Eds.),
Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Vol.1, 111–142). Oxford University Press.
Hedden, Brian (2015). Time-Slice Rationality. Mind, 124(494), 449–491.
Horgan, Terry (2008). Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty
Problem: Reply to Pust. Synthese, 160(2), 155–159.
Jeffrey, Richard (1965). The Logic of Decision. McGraw-Hill.
Jeffrey, Richard (1988). Conditioning, Kinematics, and Exchangeability. In Brian
Skyrms and William Harper (Eds.), Causation, Chance and Credence (221–255).
Kluwer.
Katsuno, Hirofumu and Alberto O. Mendelzon (1991). On the Difference be-
tween Updating a Knowledge Database and Revising It. Proceedings of the
2nd International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Rea-
soning (KR-92), 387–394.
Kern-Isberner, Gabriele (2001). Revising and Updating Probabilistic Beliefs. In M.
Williams and Hans Rott (Eds.), Frontiers in Belief Revision (393–408). Springer.
Kim, Namjoong (2009). Sleeping Beauty and Shifted Jeffrey Conditionalization.
Synthese, 168(2), 295–312.
Lang, Jérôme (2007). Belief Update Revisited. Proceedings of the 20th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2517–2522.
Leitgeb, Hannes (2016). Imaging All the People. Episteme. Advance online pub-
lication. doi:10.1017/epi.2016.14
Leitgeb, Hannes and Richard Pettigrew (2010). An Objective Justification of
Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy. Philosophy of
Science, 77(2), 236–272.
Levi, Isaac (1980). The Enterprise of Knowledge. MIT Press.
Lewis, David (1976a). Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.
The Philosophical Review, 85(3), 297–315.
Lewis, David (1976b). The Paradoxes of Time Travel. American Philosophical Quar-
terly, 13(2), 145–152.
Lewis, David (1979). Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. The Philosophical Review,
88(4), 513–543.
Lewis, David (1981). Causal Decision Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
59(1), 5–30.
Lewis, David (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
74(4), 549–567.
Lewis, David (1999). Why Conditionalize? In Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemol-
ogy (403–407). Cambridge University Press.
Magidor, Ofra (2015). The Myth of the De Se. Philosophical Perspectives, 29(1), 259–
283.
Ergo · vol. 4, no. 25 · 2017
Diachronic Norms for Self-Locating Beliefs · 737
Meacham, Christopher (2008). Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of De Se Be-
liefs. Philosophical Studies, 138(2), 245–269.
Meacham, Christopher (2010). Unravelling the Tangled Web: Continuity, Inter-
nalism, Non-Uniqueness and Self-Locating Beliefs. In Tamar Gendler and
John Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Vol. 3, 86–125). Ox-
ford University Press.
Meacham, Christopher (2016). Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Con-
ditionalization. Ergo, 3(17), 444–402.
Moss, Sarah (2012). Updating as Communication. Philosophy and Phenomenologi-
cal Research, 85(2), 225–248.
Moss, Sarah (2014). Time-slice Epistemology and Action under Indeterminacy.
In Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology,
(Vol. 1, 172–194). Oxford University Press.
Perry, John (1977). Frege on Demonstratives. Philosophical Review, 86(4), 474–497.
Piccione, Michele and Ariel Rubinstein (1997). On the Interpretation of Decision
Problems with Imperfect Recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 20(1), 3–24.
Plantinga, Alvin (1974). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford University Press.
Pollock, John L. (1984). The Foundations of Philosophical Semantics. Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Russell, Stuart J. and Peter Norvig (2010). Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Ap-
proach (3rd ed.). MIT Press.
Salmon, Nathan (1986). Frege’s Puzzle. MIT Press.
Santorio, Paolo (2011). Cognitive Relocation. Manuscript in preparation.
Schulz, Moritz (2010). The Dynamics of Indexical Belief. Erkenntnis, 72(3), 337–
351.
Schwarz, Wolfgang (2012). Changing Minds in a Changing World. Philosophical
Studies, 159(2), 219–239.
Schwarz, Wolfgang (2015). Belief Update across Fission. British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 66(3), 659–682.
Sebens, Charles T. and Sean M. Carroll (2017). Self-Locating Uncertainty and the
Origin of Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics. The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science. Advance online publication. doi:10.1093/bjps/
axw004
Skyrms, Brian (1987). Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics. Philoso-
phy of Science, 54(1), 1–20.
Spohn, Wolfgang (in press). The Epistemology and Auto-Epistemology of Tem-
poral Self-Location and Forgetfulness. Ergo.
Stalnaker, Robert (1981). Indexical Belief. Synthese, 49(1), 129–151.
Stalnaker, Robert (2008). Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford University
Press.
Stalnaker, Robert (2014). Context. Oxford University Press.
Ergo · vol. 4, no. 25 · 2017
738 · Wolfgang Schwarz
Stalnaker, Robert (2016). Modeling a Perspective on the World. In Manuel Garcì-
Carpintero and Stephan Torre (Eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Com-
munication (121–139). Oxford University Press.
Teller, Paul (1973). Conditionalization and Observation. Synthese, 26(2), 218–258.
Titelbaum, Michael G. (2008). The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs. The Philo-
sophical Review, 117(4), 555–606.
Titelbaum, Michael G. (2013). Quitting Certainties. Oxford University Press.
Titelbaum, Michael G. (2016). Self-Locating Credences. In Alan Hajek and
Christopher Hitchcock (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philos-
ophy (666–680). Oxford University Press.
Walliser, Bernard and Denis Zwirn (2002). Can Bayes’ Rule be Justified by Cog-
nitive Rationality Principles? Theory and Decision, 53(2), 95–135.
Weber, Clas (2013). Centered Communication. Philosophical Studies, 166(1), 205–
223.
Weisberg, Jonathan (2009). Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Condi-
tionalizers. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60(4), 793–812.
Williams, Peter M. (1980). Bayesian Conditionalisation and the Principle of Min-
imum Information. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 31(2), 131–144.
Williamson, Timothy (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Ergo · vol. 4, no. 25 · 2017
